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Imagine a situation where you have been pulled over by a 
police officer. The police officer thinks you may have been drinking 
and asks you to perform some field sobriety tests. You fail the tests. 
He then gives you a commonly used alcohol field test which comes up 
negative. The officer prompts you to go to the local hospital to have 
your blood and urine tested for drugs. You agree.  
 At the hospital, under the watchful eye of the police officer, a 
laboratory technician collects your chart and notices that the “Reasons 
for Test” box indicates that the cause for these tests is “Reasonable 
Suspicion/Cause.”1 Also included on the chart is a conspicuously 
placed, handwritten note stating “Blood Drug Screen—Requested by 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A Government, Franklin and Marshall College. Thank you to 
Professor Morris and Julia Lissner for all their help. Very special thank you to my 
mother, sister, family and friends for all of their support during this process and law 
school in general.  
1 See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Officer.”2 The technician takes your blood and urine samples as the 
officer watches. The results come back positive for methamphetamine. 
 Charged with “use of a controlled substance,” your trial begins. 
The police officer testifies that he saw you urinate into a cup and that 
the laboratory technician took a sample of your blood for testing. The 
police officer is the only person who is allowed to testify as to your 
medical records; the laboratory technician that conducted the tests is 
not called to testify. The results of your lab exams are admitted into 
evidence under the ordinary business records exception to the hearsay 
rule despite your objections.  
This scenario is not fiction: it is the reality of the recent 
Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Ellis.3 In Ellis, the court 
ruled that blood and urine drug screen records were not testimonial in 
nature because they were records of regularly conducted activity kept 
in the ordinary course of business, and thus, were not subject to the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.4 While the Seventh Circuit 
may have produced a result that is consistent with the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause,5 it did so through flawed reasoning.6  
This Note will first discuss the history and background of the 
hearsay rule, its exceptions, and the Confrontation Clause. It will then 
consider the issue of whether a business record prepared in 
anticipation of litigation should be admitted into evidence without 
giving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.7 
                                                 
2 See id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 927. 
5 Robert L. Windon, Crawford v. Washington - How the Seventh Circuit 
Improperly Defined “Testimonial,” 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 105 (2006), at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-1/windon.pdf. (The underlying purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause is to enhance the accuracy in the fact-finding process, 
therefore, it only approves of hearsay that is “marked with such trustworthiness that 
there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule”).  
6 Discussed further, infra. 
7 “1. One who has made a statement <in accordance with the rules of evidence, 
the statement was offered to prove the declarant's state of mind>. 2. One who has 
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
565 
In addressing that issue, this Note will focus on the line of cases that 
explain the evolution of the Confrontation Clause and its relationship 
with the hearsay exceptions. The discussion focuses on the split within 
the authorities and argues that, although the Seventh Circuit may have 
reached the right decision, it did so with flawed reasoning. Finally, this 
Note provides a possible solution to the split in authorities. This Note 
ultimately concludes that the courts are using a sliding scale when 
attempting to decide whether evidence that has been prepared in 
anticipation of litigation is testimonial or nontestimonial and propose a 
bright line rule for use in future cases. 
 
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 
 John Henry Wigmore8 famously stated that “cross-examination 
is ‘beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth.’”9 “This open examination of witnesses viva voce, 
in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing 
up of truth than the private and secret examination taken down in 
writing before an officer or his clerk.”10  
Wigmore’s quote, made over seven hundred years ago, 
reverberates loudly to this very day as evidenced by the embodiment 
of his quote’s spirit in the Constitution of the United States.11 The 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause requires that “in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
                                                                                                                   
signed a declaration, esp. one stating an intent to become a U.S. citizen <the 
declarant grew up in Italy>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed., 2004). 
8 COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001-2005). John Henry Wigmore is a 
noted American legal educator. Wigmore is most known for his work on Treatise of 
Evidence and other books on Evidence. He was a professor at Northwestern 
University School of Law from 1893 until 1901, when he became Dean of the Law 
Faculty until 1929.  
9 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367, p. 32 
(James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). 
10 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 373. 
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3
Reyes-Noyola: Objectively Unreasonable: The Seventh Circuit Limits Criminal Def
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
566 
with the witnesses against him.”12 This basic right was modified 
throughout the years as a response to such grand state trials as those of 
Sir Walter Raleigh13 and Sir John Fenwick14 because “[n]othing can be 
more essential than the cross examining [of] witnesses, and generally 
before the triers of the facts in question.”15 Moreover, “written 
evidence . . . [is] almost useless [because] it must be frequently taken 
ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”16  
The Confrontation Clause envisages personal and cross-
examination where the accused “has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness but of 
compelling him to stand face to face”17 with his accuser while the trier 
of fact has the opportunity to witness his or her character and 
demeanor.18 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is 
impossible to read the language of the Confrontation Clause literally 
because doing so would require “the exclusion of any statement made 
by a declarant not present at trial.”19 Thus, the Court has come to 
recognize and accept that some hearsay will be admissible.20 
Under Ohio v. Roberts,21 “if a court deemed a hearsay 
statement to be sufficiently reliable, the Confrontation Clause usually 
posed no barrier to admissibility.”22 A statement is considered reliable 
                                                 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
13 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-47 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. 
concurring). 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 49 (quoting R. Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer (Oct. 15, 1787)). 
16 Id.  
17 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1985). 
18 Id. 
19 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting); (while the 
Court excludes some out-of-court statements under the hearsay rules, the Court has 
come to recognize that other out-of-court statements should be admissible as 
exceptions to the hearsay rule). 
20 Id.; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970). 
21 448 U.S. 556 (1980). 
22 Prof. Richard Friedman and Jeffrey Fisher, Spotlight on the Confrontation 
Clause, available at 
4
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if it fits within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception.23 However, 
“Crawford rejected this doctrine, holding that the principal focus of 
the Clause is statements that are testimonial in nature.”24  
The Confrontation Clause has been a source of much debate—
and court attention—throughout the years.25 One recent debate has 
centered around the “complexity of reconciling the Confrontation 
Clause and the hearsay rules,”26 particularly the admissibility of 
laboratory reports such as blood-alcohol tests under the business-
records exception to the hearsay rule.27 “Prior to Crawford [v. 
Washington],28 many courts admitted lab reports, especially 
concerning analyses of controlled substances, through the testimony of 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.law.umich.edu/library/spotlight/confrontationclause/confrontationclausei
ndex.htm (last visited May 1, 2007).  
23 Id. 
24 Id. An out-of-court statement that meets that description may not be 
admitted against an accused to prove the truth of what it asserts unless the accused 
has had an opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement and that 
person— the witness—is unavailable to testify at trial. 
25 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. 
concurring); Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006); United States v. Maher, 
454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 
396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 
844,154 Wn.2d 291 (Wash. 2005). 
26 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n.9 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
27 See Steven Yermish, Cover Story: Crawford v. Washington and Expert 
Testimony: Limiting the use of Testimonial Hearsay, 30 CHAMPION 12 (2006). 
28 In 2004, the Supreme Court overruled thirty years of Ohio v. Roberts when it 
decided Crawford v. Washington. Crawford ruled that the only “indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution 
actually prescribes: confrontation.” The Court emphasized that one should focus on 
the meaning of the word testimonial, when deciding whether the evidence in 
question should be subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. (The 
interesting point being that the Court left for another day the opportunity to 
thoroughly define the word testimonial). It lessened the judge’s ability to use his or 
her own discretion when deciding the matter in question. 
5
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records custodians, lab supervisors or by certification or affidavit.”29 
Confrontation Clause issues were seldom addressed in these situations, 
although one court did recognize that there could be “constitutional 
implications of admitting such testimony.”30 
 
II. THE HEARSAY RULES AND THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION  
 
Hearsay is defined as “a statement (either a verbal assertion or 
nonverbal assertive conduct) other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted.”31 Generally, hearsay is inadmissible in a 
court proceeding because it is deemed unreliable.32 Over time, 
exceptions and exemptions to this general rule have been developed 
because courts have recognized that certain statements can be deemed 
reliable based on the fact that they are trustworthy.33 The business 
records exception to the hearsay rule is one of those situations.34 
To qualify as a “business record,”35 certain criteria must be 
met. Specifically, a business record must be “(1) a memorandum, 
report, record or data compilation . . . made at or near the time, by or 
from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, and (2) the 
information must have been kept in the course of a regularly 
                                                 
29 Yermish, supra note 27, at 12. 
30 Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(chemist’s report was inadmissible hearsay because admitting report would raise 
“legitimate doubts regarding the constitutionality” of its introduction)). 
31 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
32 Id. 
33 See Houghtaling v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 855 (Cal. App. 1993). 
34 FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
35 Id. A business record is defined as: “[A] memorandum, report, record, or 
date compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it 
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, or by certification.” 
6
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conducted business activity.”36 Once those requirements are met, a 
court may consider a document to be admissible.37 
Business records, although hearsay, have come to be 
recognized as reliable.38 They are created by a business on a day-to-
day basis in an automatic (or procedural) fashion.39 This, in turn 
makes it safe to conclude that the business record is not tainted or 
prejudiced.40 Thus, courts will be permitted to admit business records 
as evidence.41  
  The validity or reliability of a business record is tainted where 
the record is made in anticipation of litigation.42 This type of situation 
raises Confrontation Clause concerns because the record has lost its 
indicium of reliability.43 There could be a motive for the declarant to 
manipulate the information in order to further the investigation.44 
Because “records made in anticipation of litigation do not possess the 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 




42 See Yermish, supra note 27, at 13 (citing People v. Jambor, 271 Mich. App. 
1, 9 (2006) (Cooper, P.J. concurring) (The evidence in question, fingerprint cards, 
“are records prepared in anticipation of litigation, because their purpose was to 
document the presence of particular individuals at the scene of the crime”)); People 
v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.3d 393, 397 (Third Dept. 2004) (“Documents prepared for 
litigation lack the indicium of reliability necessary to invoke the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule”); People v. McDaniel, 670 N.W.2d 659, 661 (2003) 
(hearsay exception is based on the inherent trustworthiness of business records, 
which is “undermined when the records are prepared in anticipation of litigation”); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining a business-records exception as 
“[a] hearsay exception allowing business records (such as reports or memoranda) to 
be admitted into evidence if they were prepared in the ordinary course of business). 
If there is good reason to doubt a record's reliability (e.g., the record was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation), the exception will not apply. 
43 See State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1985). 
44 Id.  
7
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same trustworthiness of other records,”45 they should not be allowed in 
as evidence.46 
 Since Crawford was decided, courts have begun to note that 
“whether a statement was made with an eye towards prosecution, that 
is, with the knowledge or for the purpose that it would be used later 
for prosecution, is an important aspect of delineating between 
testimonial and nontestimonial evidence.”47 Thus, it has been 
suggested that a case-by-case analysis should be conducted to consider 
whether a document was produced “with an eye towards 
prosecution.”48  
Under such a test, if it is found that an objective witness could 
reasonably be led to believe that the statement would be used at a later 
trial,49 the court should, at the very least, consider the fact that the 
record could be testimonial evidence and prompt the State to present 
its case on why the defendant should not be entitled to its Sixth 
Amendment rights. This argument is supported by the fact that all 
evidence should be construed in the light most favorable to the 
defendant, especially in a criminal trial where the defendant’s liberty 
is at stake. 
With a better understanding of hearsay, the business record 
rules, and the Confrontation Clause, the discussion will now turn to 
how the Seventh Circuit reached its decision. Shedding light on its 
reasoning begins with the Supreme Court case of Ohio v. Roberts.50 
 
                                                 
45 City of Chicago v. Old Colony Partners, L.P., 847 N.E.2d 565, 576 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2006). 
46 Id.  
47 United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2006); see Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. concurring); State v. Crager, 164 
Ohio App. 3d 816 (2005) (statements made under circumstances that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that such statements would later be available for use 
at trial also qualify as testimonial under Crawford); see also United States v. 
Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004). 
48 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924. 
49 Id. 
50 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
8
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III. OHIO V. ROBERTS 
 
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice 
Blackmun, held that (1) a defendant’s “right[s] . . . to be confronted by 
the witnesses against [the defendant]”51 did not bar admission, at a 
criminal trial, of an unavailable witness’ statement against the 
defendant if the statement bore an “adequate indicia of reliability”;52 
and (2) to meet this test, evidence had to (a) “fall[] within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception”,53 or (b) “bear[] particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”54  
Roberts was on trial for having forged a check and for 
possession of stolen credit cards.55 The victim’s daughter was called as 
the defense’s only witness.56 The daughter testified at the preliminary 
hearing; however, she did not appear at the subsequent trial despite the 
fact that several subpoenas were sent to her parents’ home.57 The state 
attempted to offer the transcript of her previous testimony; however, 
the defense objected stating that it was a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.58 The trial court admitted the 
transcript, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed it.59 The 
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, and the case was subsequently heard 
by the United State Supreme Court on certiorari.60 
The Court concluded that the introduction of the daughter’s 
testimony did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment because her prior 
testimony “bore sufficient indicia of reliability and afforded the trier of 
                                                 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
52 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. concurring) 
(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
53 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
54 Id. 
55 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 59. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 60. 
60 Id. 
9
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fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement.”61 Furthermore, the witness was constitutionally 
unavailable for purposes of the defendant’s trial.62 The Court 
summarized its conclusion by stating that whenever a hearsay 
declarant is not available to be cross-examined, the Confrontation 
Clause “requires a showing that he is unavailable.”63 After meeting 
this burden, the statement is “admissible only if it bears adequate 
indicia of reliability.”64 An adequate indicium of reliability can be 
found when “evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception,”65 however, evidence that does not show “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness”66 under Roberts, shall be excluded in all 
circumstances.67 
For almost thirty years, the Roberts’ “indicia of reliability”68 
test was the method for determining whether evidence could be 
admitted at trial without triggering the requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause.69 However, the landscape changed dramatically 
when the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington in 2004.70  
 
IV. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
 
 In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court 
reversed almost thirty years of precedent when it concluded that “the 
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands 
is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”71 
                                                 
61 Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 n. 12 (1972)).  
62 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.  
63 Id. at 66. 




68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 See 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
71 Id. at 68-69 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. concurring). 
10
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Crawford was on trial for assault and attempted murder.72 The 
State wanted to introduce a recorded statement that the accused’s wife 
had made during a police interrogation as evidence that Crawford had 
attempted murder and not acted in self-defense.73 The accused’s wife 
did not testify at trial because of the state’s marital privilege laws.74 
The Court made note of the traditional Roberts test and concluded that 
the use of the wife’s statement was a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause because, “where testimonial statements are at issue, the only 
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is . . 
. confrontation.”75 
In concluding that Roberts must be overruled, the Crawford 
majority criticized the “indicia of reliability” method as being 
“unpredictable and inconsistent.”76 The Court stated that this method 
confers upon a judge excessive discretion in determining which factors 
are reliable and which ones are not.77 Allowing statements in simply 
because a judge deems them reliable is “fundamentally at odds with 
the right of confrontation.78 The Court further buttressed its conclusion 
by noting that the Framers were “loath to leave too much discretion in 
judicial hands.”79 
 The Court took the stance that the Roberts test was a departure 
from the Sixth Amendment’s historical principles because it would 
permit “a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, 
based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.”80 Mindful of the 
immense change it was about to produce, the Court warned that 
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously 
                                                 
72 Id. at 40. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 68-69. 
76 Id. at 66 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (Brennan, J. 
dissenting)). 
77 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67. 
78 Id. at 61. 
79 Id. at 67. 
80 Id. at 62. 
11
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reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty.”81 
 In short, the Robert’s test was one of judicial discretion which 
was highly subjective and malleable.82 Under that test, a court’s 
consideration of “[w]hether a statement [should be] deemed reliable 
depend[ed] heavily on which factors the judge consider[ed] and how 
much weight [the judge] accord[ed] each of them.”83 The Court 
forcefully stated that “[t]he unpardonable vice of the Robert’s test . . . 
[was] not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit 
core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly 
meant to exclude.”84 One such statement could be a document made 
with an eye towards litigation that was admitted under the cloak of the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
The Crawford court continued its discussion by declaring that 
“not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.”85 It 
cited examples of hearsay that is unreliable (an off-hand remark) and 
hearsay that would be arguably admissible in modern times but not in 
common law times (ex-parte examinations).86 However, the crux of 
the argument is formulated around whether a certain type of hearsay is 
considered testimonial in nature.87  
The Court used Webster’s American Dictionary of the English 
Language to define the word “testimonial” as “[a] solemn declaration 
                                                 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 60-61. 
83 Id. at 63 (“For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held a statement to be 
more reliable because its inculpation of the defendant was ‘detailed,’ . . . while the 
Fourth Circuit found a statement more reliable because the portion implicating 
another was ‘fleeting[.]’ . . . The Virginia Court of Appeals found a statement more 
reliable because the witness was in custody and charged with a crime (thus making 
the statement more obviously against her penal interest) . . ., while the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in 
custody and not a suspect”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 51. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
12
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or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”88 In order to explain the dictionary definition, the Court gave an 
illustration of a person who bears testimony: “an accuser89 who makes 
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense 
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
not.”90 While this example seems to present both extremes, the Court 
elaborated on the dictionary definition by stating, in dicta, that the 
following formulations of core classes of testimonial statements share 
a common nucleus: “[1]ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations 
. . . or [2] similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially”91 and “[3]statements that were made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for later 
use at trial.”92  
The second and third formulations—pretrial statements that a 
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and 
statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
later use at trial—are the definitions of most importance. This is 
because those formulations help demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit, 
although they may have reached the right decision, did so for the 
wrong reasons. It is important to keep these two formulations in mind 
for the discussion of the Ellis case.  
When discussing how testimonial statements would affect the 
many hearsay exceptions, the Court, in dictum, stated that “most of the 
hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not 
                                                 
88 Id. at 51 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
89 A person who accuses another of a crime. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th 
ed. 2004). 
90 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
91 Id. (quoting Br. for Pet’r at 23). 
92 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Br. for National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet’r at 3). 
13
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testimonial—for example, business records.”93 This statement seems 
inconsistent with the Court’s earlier declarations,94 leaving lower 
courts to wonder: how does one deal with hybrid business records that 
were created in anticipation of litigation or that one “would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially”?95 If it is true that business records 
are by their very nature non-testimonial, what happens when there is a 
blood and alcohol test that was created for the sole purpose of 
convicting an alleged criminal?96 Although, as we will see, this is still 
unclear, one thing is certain: “where testimonial evidence is at issue . . 
. the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross examine.”97 
 
V. STATE V. DAVIS AND DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
 
Before reaching the discussion on Ellis, there is one more set 
of important cases to discuss in this evolution: State v. Davis (“Davis 
I”)98 and on certiorari to the Supreme Court, Davis v. Washington 
(“Davis II”).99  
                                                 
93 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
94 See Yermish, supra note 27, at 13 (citing People v. Grogan, 816 N.Y.S.2d 93 
(2d Dept. 2006)(testimony of lab director and criminologist from medical examiner’s 
office established business records exception foundation for admission of DNA 
reports from rape kit); United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123, 126-27 (C.A.A.F. 
2006) (lab report is nontestimonial and admissible as a business record); State v. 
Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006) (DNA report not prepared exclusively for 
trial deemed nontestimonial); cf. Johnson v. State, 929 So.2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005), rev. granted, 920 So.2d 810 (Fla. 2006); State v. Crager, 164 Ohio App. 3d 
816 (2005) rev. granted 846 N.E.2d 533 (2006) (DNA analyst’s report prepared as 
part of a police investigation is testimonial under Crawford, regardless of whether it 
is a business record). 
95 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (quoting Br. for Pet’r at 
23). 
96 See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006). 
97 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
98 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
99 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
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Davis I was being decided when the Crawford ruling changed 
the state of the law.100 Thus, the court had to revisit its initial 
conclusions to hold that whether statements made during a 911 call are 
admissible hearsay depends on whether they are testimonial or non-
testimonial.101 The court noted that this type of determination should 
be made on a case-by-case basis and “that statements made should be 
individually evaluated for admissibility in light of the confrontation 
clause.”102 
 Davis was arrested and charged with one count of felony 
violation of the provisions of a domestic no-contact order.103 This 
arrest was prompted by a 911 call from the alleged victim, 
McCottry.104 The State only had two witnesses: the two officers that 
responded to the 911 call.105 McCottry did not testify because the State 
was not able to find her at the time of the trial.106 “The only evidence 
linking Davis to her injuries was the tape recording of the 911 call.”107 
The defense objected, arguing that the “admission of the 911 tape 
would violate Davis’s right of confrontation,”108 however, the court 
admitted the tape under the ‘excited utterance’109 hearsay exception.110  
 The court reasoned that when someone calls 911 as part of an 
ongoing emergency, he is usually not “bearing witness” to the 
                                                 
100 Davis I, 111 P.3d at 844. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 847. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 846-47. 




109 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (An excited utterance is defined 
as “A statement about a startling event made under the stress and excitement of the 
event. An excited utterance may be admissible as a hearsay exception. Fed. R. Evid. 
803(2)”). 
110 Davis I, 111 P.3d at 847 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) 
(Brennan, J. concurring)). 
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incident; he is simply calling out for help.111 However, one could be 
“bearing witness” if he calls 911 to report a crime, and this “may 
conceivably be considered testimonial.”112 The court continued that 
McCottry’s call was not intended to bear witness and was simply a call 
for help as part of an ongoing emergency.113 
In an amicus brief it was argued that it is common knowledge 
that 911 calls may be used for prosecution, making McCottry’s 
statement one that would fit within the formulations of “core 
classifications of testimonial hearsay listed in Crawford.”114 The court 
dismissed this argument because there was no evidence whatsoever 
that McCottry “had such knowledge or that it influenced her decision 
to call.”115 Thus, McCottry did not seek to “bear witness” in 
contemplation of legal proceedings (as implied by the third Crawford 
formulation) and her phone call was arguably not considered 
testimonial.116 It is important to keep this distinction in mind as well 
for the Ellis discussion below. 
 The Washington court noted that the inquiry that Crawford 
demands is “whether the ‘witness’ is testifying.”117 In order to 
determine the answer to the inquiry, one considers whether the person 
is “bearing witness”118 to the event or if the evidence sought to be 
admitted is one of the “principal evil[s] at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed” such as the civil-law mode of criminal 
                                                 
111 Davis I, 111 P.3d at 850. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. 
concurring)). 
115 Davis I, 111 P.3d at 850. 
116 Id. The court noted that “nonetheless, certain statements in the call could be 
deemed to be testimonial to the extent they were not concerned with seeking 
assistance and protection from peril. However, the information essential to the 
prosecution of this case was McCottry’s initial identification of Davis as her 
assailant.” 
117 Id. at 850. 
118 Id.  
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procedure.119 The majority did not focus much on developing a 
method for answering the Crawford inquiry, however, the dissent did. 
 The dissent, authored by Judge Sanders, focused on the two 
definitions supra and quoted the Sixth Circuit who noted that: “[t]he 
proper inquiry . . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony 
against the accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by 
querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position 
would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in 
investigating and prosecuting the crime.”120 The dissent criticized the 
majority for focusing “on the lack of evidence that McCottry ‘knew’ 
her 911 call would be used to prosecute”121 and not whether a 
“reasonable person in the 911 caller’s position would know that their 
statement is ‘likely to be used in investigation or prosecution of a 
crime.’”122  
 The dissent quoted noted scholar Richard D. Friedman: 
“Whether a statement is deemed to be testimonial . . . depends on 
whether the statement fulfills the function of prosecution testimony. 
That function, in rough terms, is the transmittal of information for use 
in prosecution.”123 According to the dissent, the 911 call performed 
this function.124 The majority did not analyze the 911 call under this 
definition, so there is no telling what they would have concluded under 
that classification.125  
                                                 
119 Id. at 850 (noting that the Confrontation Clause was particularly weary of 
the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused). 
120 Id. at 852 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 
2004)). 
121 Davis I, 111 P.3d at 852. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 853 (quoting Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of 
Testimonial, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/library/spotlight/confrontationclause/otherauthorities/arti
cles/friedman/friedmandraft.pdf at 2).  
124 Davis I, 111 P.3d at 853. 
125 See Davis II, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006). 
 
17
Reyes-Noyola: Objectively Unreasonable: The Seventh Circuit Limits Criminal Def
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
 
580 
 The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari in June of 
2006 and, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, affirmed the 
Supreme Court of Washington’s holding that “the portion of the 911 
conversation in which McCottry identified Davis was not testimonial 
and that if other portions of the conversation were testimonial, 
admitting them was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”126 Justice 
Scalia recounted the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause 
and sought to reach a more structured definition of “testimonial,” at 
least for the case that was presently before them: 
 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive 
classification of all conceivable statements—or even all 
conceivable statements in response to police 
interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial, 
it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: 
Statement are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.127 
 
Even though the definition deals specifically with interrogations, 
particularly police interrogations,128 it is important to note that Justice 
Scalia recognized that one could plausibly take this slightly more 
                                                 
126 Id. at 2271. 
127 Id. at 2273-74. 
128 Id. at 2273 n.1. Justice Scalia noted that “our holding refers to 
interrogations because, as explained below, the statements in the cases presently 
before us are the products of interrogations—which in some circumstances tend to 
generate testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made 
in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily non testimonial. 
18
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structured definition of testimonial and apply it to other 
circumstances.129 
 The above historical explanation has set forth the backdrop 
under which the Seventh Circuit reached its decision in the 2006 case 
of United States v. Ellis.130 
 
VI. UNITED STATES V. ELLIS 
 
A. The Facts 
 
On August 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit decided the matter of United States v. Ellis.131 A three judge 
panel led by Judge Kanne ruled that “because the statements of 
medical personnel ‘were made in the ordinary course of business, 
[they] are statements that by their nature were not testimonial’ and 
their admission, therefore, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”132 
 Brian K. Ellis was pulled over by a police officer in Indiana.133 
He failed some initial sobriety tests, but the field alcohol test came up 
negative.134 “With the officer’s prompting, Ellis agreed to go to a 
hospital to have his blood and urine tested for drugs.”135 Ellis was 
placed in custody and escorted to the hospital by the officers.136  
 At trial, the police officer testified that he witnessed the lab 
technician draw Ellis’s blood and watched Ellis urinate into a cup.137 
“He also testified that the results of the urine test were positive for 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006). 
131 Id. 
132 New Jersey v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1087 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007) (citing Ellis, 460 F.3d at 927). 
133 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 921. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 922. 
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methamphetamine.”138 The medical records were sought to be 
introduced under the ordinary business records exception in order to 
prove that Ellis was a controlled substance user.139 Authentication of 
the medical records was established by a certificate of authenticity 
performed by a laboratory technician, in compliance with Federal Rule 
of Evidence 902(11).140 The exhibit admitted at trial contained two 
forms filled out at the local hospital that indicated that the “collector” 
of the samples was a woman named Kristy.141 The forms had a 
preprinted “Reason[s] for Test” box that indicated that the reason for 
Ellis’s test was “Reasonable Suspicion/Cause.”142 “Furthermore, in the 
section of one of the forms indicating which test would be performed . 
. . there is a handwritten note stating ‘Blood Drug Screen—Requested 
by Officer.’”143 The urine test was conducted not only by Kristy, but 
by two out of state labs as well.144 Both out of state companies and the 
local hospital produced documents that indicated that Ellis had 
methamphetamine in his system.145 Ellis was convicted on all 
counts.146 
 Ellis argued that the admission of the blood/alcohol tests under 
the business records exception violated his guarantees under the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.147 The court did not give much 
credence to his argument; however, it considered both the business 
records issue and the certification issues in turn.148  
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (it is important to note that Ellis did not object to the authenticity of the 
records). 
141 Id. at 922. 
142 Id.  




147 Id. at 924. 
148 Id. The court addressed the issue of certification in the final part of its 
decision. Certification sets the foundational basis required to show that the evidence 
in question is admissible. It must be noted that certification does not determine 
20
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 The court quickly recognized the “obstacle”149 of the Crawford 
Court’s “designation of business records as nontestimonial.”150 The 
Court’s overbroad definition is flawed and has caused a lot of 
confusion.151 The definition is faulty primarily because “it assumes 
that all business records are, by definition, nontestimonial”152 and 
secondly, because the courts tend to disregard the “long-held standards 
or conditions applicable to defining business records”153 which tends 
to make such records testimonial as defined by Crawford.154  
One court acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s designation 
of business records as nontestimonial was purely dictum and refused 
to find it controlling.155 That court dismissed the above designation 
because, it argued that not only is it dictum, but it does not properly 
acknowledge that “while some evidence may fall within the general 
business-record exception, other business records should nonetheless 
be subject to a analysis to be excluded from evidence thereunder 
because they are in fact testimonial.”156 The Seventh Circuit preferred 
to take the literal, blanket approach, instead of a case-by-case analysis 
to resolving whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been 
violated.157 While this approach may not necessarily conflict with the 
underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause supra, it does seem to 
conflict with the current developments in the law of the Confrontation 
Clause. 
  
                                                                                                                   
whether confrontation concerns will be raised; however, it helps lay the proper 
foundation that will in turn determine whether the evidence is admissible. 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 See supra note 86. 
152 Yermish, supra note 27, at 13. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 13 n.23 (quoting State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390, 397 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005)). 
156 Yermish, supra note 27, at 13 (quoting Crager, 844 N.E.2d at 397). 
157 See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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B. The Business Records Exception as Applied in Ellis 
 
Ellis “attack[ed] the underlying medical records by arguing 
that they were created not because of routine medical procedures, but 
because of government investigation.”158 The court then makes an 
argument that they in essence seem to totally disregard. It noted that 
“the records used against Ellis . . . might be considered testimonial 
because they were created under police supervision and during an 
investigation for the purpose of determining whether a crime had been 
committed.”159 Without really explaining why it dismissed this 
seemingly viable argument, the court continued its discussion by 
indicating that “whether a statement was made with an eye toward 
prosecution, that is, with the knowledge or for the purpose that it 
would be user for later prosecution” is important when designating 
between testimonial and non testimonial statements.160 It found 
support for these statements and for the definitions of “testimonial” in 
the First,161 Second,162 Third,163 and Sixth Circuits.164 The court even 
noted that in the past it had rejected arguments made under Crawford 
because the statements were “not [considered] testimonial because 
                                                 
158 Id. at 924. 
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 924 (citing United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(holding a statement to be testimonial because “it [was] clear that an objectively 
reasonable person in [the declarant’s] shoes would understand that the statement 
would be used in prosecuting [the defendant] at trial”)). 
162 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924 (citing United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 
2004)).  
163 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924 (citing United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 
2005) (noting that statements are testimonial when “made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at later trial”) (citations and quotations omitted)).  
164 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (noting that a statement is testimonial when “a reasonable person in the 
declarant’s position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in 
investigating and prosecuting a crime”)). 
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they were not made with the respective declarants having an eye 
towards criminal prosecution.”165  
In 2004 the Second Circuit decided United States v. Saget.166 
Saget was indicted for firearms trafficking, conspiring to traffic 
firearms, and for making false statements in connection to the 
trafficking of firearms.167 Saget’s co-conspirator was a man named 
Beckham.168 Beckham engaged in several conversations with a person 
he later came to find out was a confidential informant.169 These 
conversations were tape recorded without Beckham’s knowledge.170 
At Saget’s trial, Beckham was not available to testify, and the 
state sought to admit the taped conversations under the 804(b)(3) 
hearsay exceptions.171 Because Crawford had not yet been decided, 
the trial court concluded that “the admission of the statements as 
substantive evidence of Saget’s participation in the conspiracy did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements bore 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness required under Ohio v. 
Roberts.”172 However, before oral arguments were heard, the Supreme 
Court decided Crawford v. Washington, which dramatically changed 
the legal landscape.173 
On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that “Crawford at least 
suggests that the determinative factor in determining whether a 
                                                 
165 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 925 (quoting United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 
795-96 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 
(2004))). 
166 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). 




171 Id. Rule 803(b)(3) speaks to the hearsay exception relating to statements 
made against penal interest. 
172 Saget, 377 F.3d at 225. 
173 Id. at 226. Crawford, discussed passim, held that no prior testimonial 
statement made by a declarant who does not testify at the trial may be admitted 
against a defendant unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her. 
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declarant bears testimony is the declarant’s awareness that his or her 
statement may later be used at trial.”174 It further intimated that the 
examples presented in Crawford “provide that the statement must be 
such that the declarant reasonably expects that the statement might be 
used in future judicial proceedings.”175 While the Supreme Court did 
not expressly adopt any particular or express definition, because they 
all share a common nucleus, the Second Circuit argued that the 
Supreme Court would probably agree to use the “reasonable 
expectation of the declarant as the anchor of a more concrete 
definition of testimony.”176 Thus, a more narrow definition of 
testimonial began to emerge.  
The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hinton177 
echoes the Second Circuit’s ruling in Saget.178 The court began its 
opinion by reciting the changes in the law post Crawford and 
continued by stating that “where an objective witness reasonably 
anticipates that a given statement will be used at a later trial, that 
statement is likely testimony in the sense that it is offered to establish 
or prove a fact.”179  
Hinton had appealed his conviction for possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine.180 The main issue, as with the other relevant 
cases, is whether the evidence being sought to be admitted was 
testimonial in nature, and thus, subject to the Confrontation Clause.181 
However, the key question is what is the definition of testimonial? 
This court derived its definition of testimonial from the 
Supreme Court’s use of the word witness.182 “The term ‘witnesses’ . . . 
embraces all those who ‘bear testimony,’ whether at trial or outside the 
                                                 
174 Id. at 228. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005). 
178 See Saget, 377 F.3d 223. 
179 Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355, 357-59. 
180 Id. at 356. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 358. 
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courtroom.”183 Thus, it settled on the language that implies that 
“testimony” is “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”184 Once the court 
reached the conclusion supra, it acknowledged what the Court in 
Crawford stated as one of its formulation for defining testimonial: 
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at later trial.”185 To further support its conclusion, the 
Third Circuit again cited to the Supreme Court’s language in 
Crawford: “where an objective witness reasonably anticipates that a 
given statement will be used at a later trial, that statement is likely 
testimony in the sense that it is offered to establish or prove a fact. As 
such, absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination, it must be subjected to the strictures of the Confrontation 
Clause.”186 
Moreover, the Third Circuit, through the Supreme Court’s very 
language, supports the Second Circuit’s conclusion that when a 
witness can anticipate that the statement he or she is making could be 
used at trial, the only way to avoid Sixth Amendment issues is to allow 
the witness to testify and to be cross-examined by the defendant.187 
The Third Circuit’s definition was supported again with the 
First Circuit’s July of 2006 decision, United States v. Maher.188 Maher 
dealt with “the admission of [a] non-testifying informants’ out-of-
court statements through the testimony of police officers.”189 Because 
this case was heard after Crawford was decided, the controlling law 
dictated that a testimonial out-of-court statement is inadmissible unless 
“(1) the declarant testifies, or (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination and the declarant is unavailable, or (3) the 
                                                 
183 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). 
184 Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355, 358 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
185 Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355, 358 
186 Id. at 360 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68). 
187 See generally Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355. 
188 454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006). 
189 Id. at 19. 
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evidence is admitted for purposes other than establishing the truth of 
the matter asserted.”190 
Since the Crawford decision did not specifically define 
testimonial, it has been up to the courts to narrow the scope of the 
definition.191 The Maher court acknowledged that in “applying 
Crawford, . . . a statement is testimonial if a reasonable declarant, 
similarly situated, would have the capacity to appreciate that the 
statement is of a sort typically preserve[d] . . . for . . . potential 
prosecutorial use.”192 In this case, the police officer’s testimony about 
what he learned from a third party falls within the definition of 
testimonial because it is similar, if not identical, to one of the 
examples193 given by the Crawford court of a testimonial statement.194 
Other evidence indicated that the statement should be 
considered testimonial: it should be testimonial because the police 
officer and the informant made a cooperation agreement which 
strongly indicates that the statement would be used prosecutorially.195 
Thus, this case supports the proposition that if a declarant is available 
to testify, and the statement fits the definition of testimonial supra, 
then the Confrontation Clause will be violated if the declarant does not 
testify in open court.196 
                                                 
190 Id. at 19-20 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 59 n.9 (Rehnquist, J. 
concurring)). 
191 See United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Hinton, 423 F.3d 
355; Maher, 454 F.3d 13. 
192 Maher, 454 F.3d at 19 (citing United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60-61 
(1st Cir. 2005) (holding that 911 calls may be testimonial in certain circumstances) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
193 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (stating various formulations of this core class of 
“testimonial” statements exist: “material such as affidavits [and] custodial 
examinations”). 
194 Maher, 454 F.3d at 19.  
195 Id. at 21. 
196 Id. 
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The cases supra primarily involve situations where a police 
officer is testifying on what he heard from an informant.197 Although 
this is not the exact same situation in Ellis, the underlying concern is 
the same: an out-of-court statement made by a witness that can 
reasonably anticipate that his or her statement could be used 
prosecutorially needs to be available to testify as to his or her 
declaration or risk violating the defendant’s constitutional rights.198 
The Seventh Circuit cited these cases and acknowledged what each 
one held.199  
 The Ellis court continued to move in the direction of finding a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause and cited to the cases discussed 
supra as well as pointing out that “Ellis . . . appear[s] to be on strong 
ground in arguing that the results of his medical tests were 
testimonial” because “[i]t must have been obvious to Kristy200 . . . that 
her results might end up as evidence against Ellis in some kind of 
trial.”201 Besides it allegedly being obvious to Kristy that the test 
results may be used at trial, the court cited further circumstances that 
would lend a reasonable witness to conclude that the statement could 
be used prosecutorially.202 A police officer not only escorted Ellis to 
the hospital, but he also watched as the tests were performed.203 The 
lab charts clearly indicated that the reason for the test was 
“Reasonable Suspicion/Cause” and that they were “Requested by 
Officer.”204 Unlike the complete lack of evidence in Stave v. Davis,205 
                                                 
197 See Hinton, United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 355 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Maher, 454 F.3d at 13. 
198 See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 
(2d Cir. 2004); Hinton, 423 F.3d at 355; Maher, 454 F.3d at 13. 
199 United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2006). 
200 Kristy is the laboratory technician who performed the tests on Mr. Ellis. 
201 Id. at 924. 
202 Id. at 921-22. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 924. 
205 State v. Davis (“Davis I”), 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005) (stating that 
there was no evidence whatsoever that McCottry knew or should have known that 
her statements would be used at trial when she made the call to 911). 
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supra, the court pointed to ample evidence that indicated that Kristy, 
the lab technician, should have known that these lab exams and the 
results were “pretrial statements that . . . would reasonably [be] 
expect[ed] to be used prosecutorially,”206 or “statements that were 
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.”207 Applying this objective, reasonable witness standard, 
one would think the court would have concluded that the laboratory 
records were testimonial, however the court chose to go in a different 
direction than the cases supra208 and did just the opposite.209 
 One small “nevertheless” later and the court dismissed its 
previous four paragraphs worth of arguments210 that are consistent 
with Crawford.211 The reason behind its decision was eloquently put: 
the court “d[id] not think th[o]se circumstances transform[ed] what 
[wa]s otherwise a nontestimonial business record into a testimonial 
statement implicating the Confrontation Clause.”212 This succinctly 
put statement begs one particular question: what rises to the level of 
implicating the Confrontation Clause? Intriguingly, the court does not 
proffer any support for its one-sentence assertion supra, and it cites 
                                                 
206 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (citing White v. Illinois, 
502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) and Br. for National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Pet’r at 3). 
207 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) 
and Br. for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Pet’r at 3). 
208 See Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924. 
209 Id. at 924-26. 
210 Id. In United States v. Ellis, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
devotes at least four full paragraphs to arguments that would logically support a 
conclusion that Kristy should have known that the statements would be used for later 
trial. Thus, under the third formulation of Crawford, her acts would be considered 
testimonial, and therefore only admissible as evidence if the declarant is available to 
testify and the defendant had a chance to cross-examine the declarant. However, as 
noted in the article supra, the court rejects its own conclusions without much 
support. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 925. 
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only two cases213 infra for substantiation of its highly subjective 
conclusion.214 
The court may have been correct in its determination if Roberts 
was still the controlling law;215 however the court seems to disregard 
the recent change in the law under the Crawford rule that the court 
clearly acknowledges exists.216 In an effort to understand why the 
Seventh Circuit came to this conclusion, it leads to the question: How 
are other courts handling similar issues? 
  
VII. OTHER COURT’S APPLICATIONS OF THE  
BUSINESS-RECORDS EXCEPTION AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 
 Recent state court decisions have grappled with issues that are 
similar to Ellis and have ruled contrary to the Seventh Circuit.217 The 
following will discuss the cases, state what they concluded, and 
attempt to explain why they ruled differently than the Seventh Circuit. 
Of course, these decision are not binding precedent, however, they 
may shed some light on why the Seventh Circuit’s argument is flawed. 
 
A. Rivera v. Florida 
 
 In September of 2005, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Fifth District heard the case of Rivera v. Florida.218 Salvador Rivera 
                                                 
213 For support, the Seventh Circuit cites to: United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 
421 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 
680 (5th Cir. 2005) both holding that certificates of non-existence of records are 
nontestimonial and thus their admission does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
214 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924-26. 
215 Under Roberts, a judge is afforded much more discretion because the test 
allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay in if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception or if the court deems the statement to be reliable. 
216 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 924-26. 
217 See, e.g., Martin v. Florida, 936 So.2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(Thomas, J. dissenting); Rivera v. Florida, 917 So.2d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); 
New Jersey v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) 
218 Rivera, 917 So. 2d 210. 
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had been on trial for allegedly trafficking cocaine.219 He appealed the 
lower court’s decision by arguing that “the court erred in introducing a 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) lab report through 
the records custodian and in limiting his right to cross-examine the 
confidential informant involved in his case.”220 In this case, the State 
tried to introduce the lab reports through the testimony of one Amanda 
Julian, the supervisor of the chemist who conducted the lab test.221 The 
lower court overruled Rivera’s hearsay objection and the District 
Court of Appeal of Florida reversed, concluding that the admission of 
the lab report without the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 
was in error.222 
 The court’s main argument revolved around the concern that it 
“is Rivera’s constitutional right to confront his accusers in a criminal 
trial.”223 The court recognized that lab “tests performed in the usual 
course of hospital business are admissible in criminal cases under the 
business records exception” because they are inherently trustworthy.224 
If the reports are reliable enough for medical purposes, then they 
should be reliable enough for trial.225 However, it failed to extend this 
exception to the FDLE lab report because allowing the record into 
evidence without the opportunity for cross-examination would 
“threaten Rivera’s right under the Confrontation Clause to question the 
witness to ensure a fair trial.”226 By cross-examining the declarant, the 
defense could have questioned him or her about “chain of custody, 
methods of scientific testing, and analytical procedures regarding” the 
reports at issue.227 The court succinctly concluded its argument by 
                                                 
219 Id. at 211. 
220 Id. 
221 Id.  
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 212. 
225 Id. (citing Baber v. State, 775 So.2d 258, 260-61 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 
532 U.S. 1022 (2001)). 
226 Rivera, 917 So.2d at 212. 
227 Id. 
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persuasively stating that: “[T]he chemist’s report lacks the indicia of 
reliability characteristic of hospital record cases. The hospital tests a 
patient’s blood alcohol for the benefit of the patient’s treatment; in 
contrast, the State tests alleged drug samples to incriminate and 
convict the accused.”228 
 This language plainly sets forth a logical way of looking at the 
intersection between the Confrontation Clause and the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule.229 If lab records or similar 
documents are being used to incriminate and convict an accused, then 
the accused should retain his Sixth Amendment right to confront his 
accuser.230 Otherwise, accusers may attempt to thwart the Constitution 
by allowing “the State to sidestep . . . prov[ing] the elements of the 
charged offense.”231 It is especially important when the evidence being 
sought to be admitted is crucial to the State’s case. 
 A second Florida state court case echoes the decision made in 
Rivera, supra. 
 
B. Martin v. Florida 
 
 The facts in Martin v. Florida closely mirror those of Rivera. 
The defendant had been on trial for possession of cocaine and 
cannabis and was appealing those convictions.232 The State also 
attempted to admit an FDLE report to show that the “substances seized 
from Martin were contraband.”233 Martin objected to the admission of 
the FDLE report and the lower court overruled the objection.234 The 
Court of Appeal reversed holding that “admission of the FDLE report 
as a business record without giving appellant the right to examine the 
                                                 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id.  
231 Id.  
232 Martin v. Florida, 936 So. 2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
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author of the report was reversible error”235 because under Crawford, 
“the admission of hearsay evidence which was ‘testimonial’ in nature 
violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable to 
testify and unless the defendant had a prior meaningful opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant.”236 The court recognized that Crawford 
did not define testimonial and that the Court noted that business 
records are by their nature nontestimonial. However, the Court of 
Appeal did not get bogged down by Crawford’s dicta and, unlike the 
Seventh Circuit, focused on the language that implied that testimonial 
statements were those statements that a witness “reasonably expect[] 
to be used prosecutorially”237 or which “would be available for use at 
later trial.”238  
 The court continued its discussion by admitting that the FDLE 
report “may meet the definition of a business record,”239 however, 
because it was prepared in anticipation of litigation, it should not have 
been admitted without the opportunity for cross-examination.240 “The 
testing memorialized in the report was occasioned solely by the arrest 
of the appellant and was performed by a state law enforcement agency, 
and the report was offered by the State in furtherance of a criminal 
prosecution.”241 This statement could easily be taken out of the instant 
case and transplanted into the Ellis opinion in order to support the 
conclusion that the blood and alcohol lab reports were, in fact, 
testimonial in nature. 
 The dissent in this case disagreed with the majority’s decision 
and cited a series of cases for support.242 Moreover, the dissent, much 
                                                 
235 Id. at 1192. 
236 Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)). 
237 Martin, 936 So. 2d at 1192 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55). 




242 Id.; see also People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(laboratory reports routine and nontestimonial documents); Commonwealth v. 
Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005) (laboratory report on weight of cocaine a 
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like the Seventh Circuit, focused on the conclusion in dicta that 
business records are a likely example of a nontestimonial statement.243 
Its argument continued by refuting the majority’s argument that the 
FDLE report was created solely to convict the accused, and thus was 
testimonial, by stating that “an FDLE record is not always intended to 
bear witness against the accused, because it could also be used to 
exonerate the accused.”244 However, it stands to reason that if the 
defense were to introduce this evidence as conclusory, the State may 
want to argue that without an opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant, the lab report, created in anticipation of litigation and being 
used to exonerate the accused, could be just as unreliable and 
untrustworthy. 
 The dissent concluded that the lab report met the definition of a 
business record as defined in the Florida Statute and it declined the 
majority’s in anticipation of litigation argument.245 “FDLE has no 
motive to fabricate its reports and has no financial interest at stake. 
Further, FDLE will not suffer adverse consequences if its scientists 
report that a tested substance is not contraband.”246 It summed up its 
arguments by stating that FDLE lab reports are not produced by law 
enforcements officers in adversarial settings, unlike an arresting 
officer’s affidavit, and they are “exactly the type of business records 
that the legislature intended to authorize as exceptions to the business 
rule.”247 While this may be true, it begs the question: Is it fair to infer 
that an arresting officer’s affidavit, conducted in the regular course of 
his official business, used as evidence to prove or disprove an 
accused’s innocence, is so inherently unreliable that it is automatically 
subject to confrontation? However, a lab report created by a non-
governmental entity solely to prove or disprove an accused’s alleged 
                                                                                                                   
business record); People v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. 2005) (DNA testing 
records nontestimonial). 
243 Martin, 936 So.2d at 1193. 
244 Id. at 1194. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 1195. 
247 Id. at 1196. 
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crime is not? There are no clear answers to these questions because 
even amongst the different state courts, there is a large disagreement 
on whether laboratory reports are testimonial or nontestimonial in 
nature.248  
 
VIII. DID THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GET IT RIGHT? 
 
 The Seventh Circuit blindly holds on to the Crawford court’s 
language (in dictum) that business records are by their very nature, 
nontestimonial statements.249 It makes it clear that “[it] do[es] not 
think it matters that these observations were made with the knowledge 
that they might be used for criminal prosecution.”250 But what about 
the three formulations set forth in Crawford of what constitutes a 
testimonial statement? The Seventh Circuit acknowledges the 
formulations and even comments that “[w]hether a statement was 
made with an eye toward prosecution, that is, with the knowledge that 
it would be used for later prosecution, is an important aspect of 
delineating between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence.”251 
Despite this acknowledgement and with very little reasoning and 
support, the court disregards the Crawford formulations.252 However, 
the court does attempt to provide some support for its seemingly 
unreasonable statement by citing two cases, one from the Court of 
                                                 
248 See, e.g., id. (citing People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Crum’s. 
2005) (breathalyzer test results regular business records); People v. Durio, 794 
N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. 2005) (autopsy reports business records); but cf. Belvin v. State, 
922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a breath-test affidavit was 
testimonial hearsay and not admissible as a business record because the affidavit was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation)). 
249 United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2006); 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 924 (emphasis added). 
252 Id. The court also declares that the records used against Ellis may be 
considered testimonial in nature because “they were created under police supervision 
and during an investigation for the purpose of determining whether a crime had been 
committed.” This is a crucial argument that the court simply disregards without 
explanation. 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit253 and one from the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit.254 
The facts presented in both of these cases are very similar, and 
thus, are considered together. The plaintiffs in both these cases were 
immigrants who were subsequently caught in the United States 
without the proper authorization to remain in the country.255 Each 
plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the government alleging that the 
admission of the certificates of non-existence of records (“CNR”), 
without the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, violated their 
Sixth Amendment rights.256 Both of these cases held that CNRs “were 
nontestimonial despite the fact that they were prepared by the 
government in anticipation of criminal prosecution” because the 
creation of the documents was “routine” and too dissimilar from the 
“examples of testimonial evidence provided by Crawford.”257  
This line of reasoning is faulty, and these courts erred in a 
similar manner as the Seventh Circuit did in Ellis. Specifically, all 
three courts disregarded the definitions set forth in the three Crawford 
formulations, supra, and single-mindedly held on to the “non-
exhaustive” list of examples of testimonial statements.258 The three 
courts used a strict, literal approach to their arguments by reading only 
the black letters written on the page and ignoring the spirit of the 
Confrontation Clause and of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
 Justice Scalia stated in Davis v. Washington that “[o]ur opinion 
in Crawford set forth various formulations of the core class of 
testimonial statements . . . but found it unnecessary to enforce any of 
them, because some statements qualify under any definition.”259 It is 
hard to believe that the Seventh Circuit would strictly adhere to one 
                                                 
253 United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005). 
254 United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005). 
255 Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828; Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680. 
256 Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828; Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d at 680. 
257 Ellis, 460 F.3d at 925-26 (internal quotations omitted). 
258 Id. 
259 Davis v. Washington (“Davis II”), 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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example stated in dictum of what testimonial is not, disregard the spirit 
behind the generalizations made in the non-exhaustive list of core 
class of testimonial statements, and ignore the formulations that were 
stated in Crawford,260reiterated in Davis I261 and Davis II.262 
Ellis dealt with laboratory records of blood and alcohol tests.263 
It was argued that the only reason for the existence of the records was 
for use at trial to prove that a crime had occurred.264 Similarly, in 
Cervantes-Flores and Rueda-Rivera, the defense also argued that the 
only reason for the existence of the records was the immigration 
proceeding, and thus, the records should not be ordinary business 
records.265 Despite the parallel arguments, the two records are very 
dissimilar. 
Ordinary laboratory records are created when a patient 
voluntarily seeks medical attention at a hospital or a laboratory. The 
documents are prepared in a routine manner on a daily basis. They are 
not prepared with an eye towards prosecution or in anticipation of 
litigation. Thus, they are inherently trustworthy and can be admitted at 
trial under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  
                                                 
260 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (Using formulations two 
and three to define what testimonial statements are: Pretrial statements that a 
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and statements made 
under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
the statement would be available for later use at trial). 
261 State v. Davis, (“Davis I”), 111 P.3d 844, 853 (Wash. 2005) (quoting 
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (Using the following to 
help narrow the incomplete definition of testimonial: A statement made by a 
declarant who seeks to bear witness against the accused determined by querying 
whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his 
statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime). 
262 Davis II, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (Using the following to help define testimonial: 
“They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”). 
263 See Ellis, 460 F.3d 920. 
264 Id. at 924. 
265 See United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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The laboratory test conducted in Ellis was prepared solely for 
use at trial, at the request of an officer (not the patient), and is a perfect 
example of exactly what the Sixth Amendment was created to protect. 
It is not an ordinary business record because the document is serving 
as a “witness” that a crime occurred, thus falling squarely within the 
definitional of testimonial as set forth in Crawford.266 Therefore, the 
record should not have been admitted into evidence unless the 
defendant had a chance to meaningfully cross-examine the declarant267 
as to the method and manner of preparing and maintaining the 
document in question.  
In contrast, the CNR can be seen as an ordinary business 
record. A CNR is routinely created to prove the absence of a 
document.268 A CNR can be made at the request of an immigration 
officer or a party to a lawsuit.269 In contrast to the two different ways 
that a laboratory record can come to exist, it appears that a CNR only 
exists for one purpose: to prove, at a proceeding, whether a certain 
document exists. Thus, it can be argued that the record is prepared in 
the same manner and for the same reason every time it is requested 
making the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the two CNR cases for 
support misplaced. 
 The Seventh Circuit continues to puzzle its audience by citing 
to it own decision, United States v. Gilbertson.270 The court, in an 
opinion also authored by Judge Kanne, declared that odometer 
statements were not testimonial in nature because they were not made 
with an eye towards criminal prosecution.271 It continued its discussion 
by stating that the declarations were not initiated by the government, 
nor made with the hope that they would later be used at trial against 
any defendant.272 In addition, each statement in question was made 
                                                 
266 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
267 Id. at 68. 
268 See Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 831 n.2. 
269 Id. 
270 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006). 
271 Id. at 796. 
272 Id. 
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prior to a defendant’s involvement in any crime.273 Thus, the court’s 
conclusion seems to flow logically from its reasoning. Unfortunately, 
this decision only serves to highlight the objectively unreasonable 
conclusion in Ellis. 
 The Ellis court cites the Gilbertson holding in its discussion of 
all the evidence that supports the conclusion that “Ellis may . . . be on 
strong ground in arguing that the results of his medical tests were 
testimonial.”274 This can be found in those four paragraphs, supra, that 
argue the reasons why the laboratory test results should be testimonial 
in nature.275 Gilbertson’s logic, when applied to Ellis, supports the 
conclusion that a statement is testimonial in nature, despite being 
labeled as a business record, if it is made with an eye towards criminal 
prosecution. Although the cases are factually different, the underlying 
premise is the same: when a document is prepared with an eye toward 
prosecution, it should be deemed testimonial, and thus afforded the 
protections of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. 
 In light of the conclusions reached in Gilbertson, it is very 
difficult to comprehend, let alone reconcile, how the same court came 
to the opposite conclusion in Ellis. Unfortunately, an analysis of other 
decisions in other courts does little to clarify why the Seventh Circuit 
ruled as it did. 
  
IX. WHERE IS THE POLICY? 
 
 Public policy helps bolster legal conclusions by putting them in 
the context of the impact on society. Unfortunately, the Seventh 
Circuit does not use any public policy arguments to support its 
seemingly arbitrary conclusion in Ellis. Perhaps the court should have 
inserted some well thought out policy arguments to support its 
conclusion. 
 It is a well-known fact that dockets are over-crowded and 
state’s attorneys, public defenders and trial attorneys are 
                                                 
273 Id. 
274 United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2006). 
275 Id. (see also note 206, supra). 
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overworked.276 By limiting the number of witnesses a party is required 
to present at trial, the average length of a trial can be shortened. 
Safeguards exist in order to ensure that parties receive their Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial. One such safeguard is the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule (discussed supra). When the foundation 
is laid properly, statements that fall under these exceptions have 
historically been deemed reliable and trustworthy and thus are 
admissible in court without lengthy presentations about where the 
statements came from or how they were made.277 Imagine a trial where 
every receipt, record, memoranda and document had to be presented in 
court by each and every declarant. Then, imagine sitting through each 
and every direct and cross-examination. This scenario would certainly 
make for lengthy, tedious trials and the core mission of the fact-finder 
would be endlessly delayed in a needless procedural quagmire. Policy 
suggests that in order for the public to benefit from fair and just trials, 
certain reasonable concessions must exist. Restricting the types of 
witnesses that are required to testify at trial is one such concession. 
 Ensuring the right of justice for all the parties involved is 
crucial. One such element of ensuring justice is monitoring the 
constitutional rights of all the parties involved. Courts should not be 
allowed to simply have a blanket “hearsay exception” approach for 
situations such as Ellis, Martin, and Davis without considering the 
individual facts of the case. For example, laboratories have produced 
what are known as “false positive” results in the past.278 A “false 
positive” is “[a] result that is erroneously positive when a situation is 
normal.”279 When conducted again, the same test can provide a 
different result. A criminal defendant should be allowed to cross-
examine a declarant who has created a document, memoranda or other 
                                                 
276 See, e.g., Alison Retka, A typical week with Missouri Attorney Jasman Lutz, 
MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, April 23, 2007; Jerry Crimmins, On defense: Crimes 
that fiction wouldn't touch, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, March 27, 2007. 
277 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
278 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Green v. Bd. Of County 
Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Comprehensive Drug 
Testing Inc., 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006). 
279 WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2003). 
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such statement that will be used at trial as evidence against the 
defendant. A blanket approach does not seem fair, much less 
constitutional, when it comes to the rights of criminal defendants. The 
public would not benefit from such an approach and the courts should 
be weary about attempting to implement one. 
 There will be certain occasions when it will be appropriate to 
use one of the many hearsay exceptions to offer a statement into 
evidence without presenting the witness. That is exactly why the 
hearsay exceptions exist. However, in certain situations (such as when 
a statement is prepared in anticipation of litigation) courts should 
make case-by-case, factual determinations on whether the specific 
situation warrants a blanket hearsay exception approach, or if the 
situation mandates closer scrutiny. The Confrontation Clause exists for 
many reasons, including protecting a criminal defendant’s right to 
confronting any and all hostile witnesses against him. In these 
situations, and with the high stakes of a criminal prosecution, one or 
two extra witnesses seem worth the time spent, especially if it means 
protecting a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. The integrity of 
the system demands it. 
 
X. PROPOSED NEW RULE 
 
 Courts should attempt to create one uniform way of classifying 
and dealing with business records that are made in anticipation of 
litigation. There are many benefits to have one uniform rule: 
consistency in application, a bright line rule for potential litigants to 
follow, as well as ease in applying and understanding the rule.  
In order to classify this hybrid type of business records, courts 
should look to formulations two and three of the Crawford decision.280 
Such hybrid statements can include, but are not limited to: (1) 
                                                 
280 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Formulation two states 
that testimonial statements are those pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially and formulation three declares that 
testimonial means statements that were made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
later use at trial). 
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laboratory records made solely in anticipation of litigation;281 (2) 
records created to solely prove that a crime was committed;282 (3) 
records that would otherwise be ordinary business records but were 
created solely with an eye towards prosecution.  
Thus, a new rule is proposed: if a document is prepared in 
anticipation of litigation (meaning it fits within one of the two 
formulations supra), then the document should be considered 
testimonial, and thus afforded the protections of the Confrontation 
Clause.283 This is so because it is extremely important to err on the 





 The definition of testimonial has definitely evolved since 
Crawford was decided in 2004.284 The courts have grappled with its 
meaning and attempted to narrow the scope of the definition. It has 
become clear that statements that are made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later criminal trial should 
only be admissible if the declarant is available to testify and there has 
been an opportunity to cross-examine him or her. However, as this 
Note has shown, confusion still exists as to how to classify business 
records that were created in anticipation of litigation. The proposed 
                                                 
281 See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006). 
282 See Martin v. Florida, 936 So.2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Rivera v. 
Florida, 917 So.2d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
283 The protection of the Confrontation Clause is: ensuring that the defendant 
has a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. 
284 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Rehnquist, J. 
concurring); Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006); United States v. Maher, 
454 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 
396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 
844,154 Wn.2d 291 (Wash. 2005). 
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rule, supra, would provide a workable directive that would help ease 
judicial inconsistency and help establish a consistent way to deal with 
this hybrid form of business records. 
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